Terrorism in India
In India’s responses to Pakistan-backed terror, New Delhi needs to sharpen its definition of what is an ‘unacceptable’ terror attack
पाकिस्तान समर्थित आतंकवाद के प्रति भारत की प्रतिक्रिया में, नई दिल्ली को 'अस्वीकार्य' आतंकवादी हमले की अपनी परिभाषा को और स्पष्ट करने की आवश्यकता है।
The Reasi terrorist attack of June 9
1 the day the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, took his oath of office for a third term, , is reminiscent of the attack on the Consulate General of India (CGI), Herat, Afghanistan on May 23, 2014, three days prior to his first swearing-in.
2 Nine pilgrims lost their lives in the attack in Reasi (in Jammu and Kashmir) and 41 were injured. Fortunately, the four Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists who attacked CGI Herat were detected in time.
3 One of the terrorists who reached the door of the building was neutralised by an alert Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) jawan.
The terrorists had come with the intention of
- taking hostages / बन्धक व्यक्ति
- a long-haul operation to coincide with Mr. Modi’s oath-taking ceremony.
4 Clearly, both attacks had the same objective:
to embarrass and enrage Mr. Modi and India on a day of great political significance.
Continuing challenge
How India is dealing
what they think ?
Pakistan and separatists in J&K were encouraged by the success of the Afghan Jihad.
Pakistan thought that if a superpower could be defeated by Afghan Islamist groups,
give pressure to India in Kashmir through
- mass uprisings / bagavat ,
- violence against minorities,
- and terrorist actions against prominent personalities and the security forces,
- leading this country to abandon Kashmir.
The Pakistan Army and its political class
Support of terror
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto who became Pakistan’s Prime Ministers in turn were supportive of the promotion of separatism in J&K by the army and intelligence agencies, through the use of terror.
Ms. Bhutto decided not to hold talks with India in 1994 unless India was willing to purposefully engage Pakistan on J&K in a manner Pakistan prescribed.
there was no dialogue between the two countries while she was in office. Mr. Sharif became Prime Minister in 1997, for the second time. He decided to change Ms. Bhutto’s policy and engage India.
focus on all issues
Pakistan desired a structured dialogue with India which would focus on all issues —
- humanitarian,
- conflict resolution
- and the development of cooperative mechanisms.
India wished to discuss Pakistani terrorism as a separate issue in the dialogue process.
By the mid-1990s, India had gained the confidence to manage terrorism in J&K. While it was exacting / increasing toll in lives and had disrupted normalcy, we confirmed that Pakistan would take the State out of India’s grip had gone.
Assembly elections in J&K in 1996
The decision to hold Assembly elections in J&K in 1996 was a signal that while the application of force to counter terrorism was necessary and would continue, there was space to begin political activity.
India’s choosing diplomacy, dialogue
1 Use of power and political activity in j and k
Thus, a combination of force and the restoration of political activity was used to address the problem in Kashmir: a problem within India’s internal jurisdiction.
2 recovery of the State’s territory in Pakistani control
Distinct from the problem in Kashmir was the issue of Kashmir. This related to the recovery of the State’s territory in Pakistani control.
Under the Simla Agreement of 1972, India was committed to resolving this issue peacefully, through negotiations.
भारत ने विवाद और बातचीत का रास्ता चुना
1972 में, यह विचार नहीं किया गया था कि पाकिस्तान अपने नियंत्रण में इस्लामवादी गैर-राज्य अभिनेताओं के माध्यम से आतंकवाद को बढ़ावा देगा।
इसलिए, शिमला समझौते द्वारा लगाए गए प्रतिबंध तब निरर्थक हो गए जब पाकिस्तान ने आतंकवाद का सहारा लिया और भारत वैध रूप से पाकिस्तानी आतंकवाद को एक 'रणनीतिक' मुद्दे के रूप में मान सकता था, यानी, जिसके लिए बाहरी क्षेत्र में बल प्रयोग की आवश्यकता थी। हालाँकि, भारत ने कूटनीति और बातचीत का रास्ता चुना।
bilateral composite dialogue
India and Pakistan agreed on the mechanics of a bilateral composite dialogue in September 1998.
The composite dialogue listed ‘terrorism and counter-narcotics’ as one of the eight issues of engagement
जम्मू-कश्मीर में करीब दो लाख सुरक्षाकर्मियों को तैनात करना
This has continued to remain Pakistan’s attitude because the calibrated use of terrorist groups against India became a part of its security doctrine from the 1990s.
Pakistan has adopted this approach for, it has meant pinning down an estimated two lakh security personnel in J&K to handle terrorism. That is a conservative number.
What did our leader
From 1998 to 2016, all three Prime Ministers — Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi — pursued the path of diplomacy, as part of the Composite Dialogue, to address Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.
joint anti-terrorism mechanism
Indeed, Dr. Manmohan Singh tried to insulate the larger bilateral relationship by establishing with Pakistan a joint anti-terrorism mechanism, but it went nowhere.
public opinion in India -
was for military action after an ‘unacceptable’ terrorist attack or provocative and ‘unacceptable’ Pakistani action.
withdraw from the dialogue
governments chose only to withdraw from the dialogue process. A example was 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack when Dr. Manmohan Singh opted out of the dialogue process; he chose to garner global diplomatic support against Pakistan.
India had seriously considered using its military forces against Pakistan in December 2001, as a reaction to the terror attack on Parliament
not to go to war
The A.B. Vajpayee government mobilised the Indian armed forces but eventually decided not to go to war because President Pervez Musharraf gave an assurance that Pakistan would not use territory under its control to promote terrorism against India. It did not keep its word.
The use of pre-emption
used military force
Where India actually departed from the use of diplomacy and used military force against Pakistani terrorism was after the Pulwama attack of 2019
It undertook the Balakot aerial strike (2019) and also announced a doctrine of pre-emption. Earlier too it had used force in a limited way by way of undertaking surgical strikes in the wake of the Uri terrorist attack of September 2016.
सवाल यह है कि 'अस्वीकार्य' क्या है ?
इन वचनों के बावजूद, बल प्रयोग पर अस्पष्टता बनी हुई है। जाहिर है, 'अस्वीकार्य' हमले के खिलाफ कार्रवाई की जानी चाहिए। इसके अलावा, पूर्व-आक्रमण का सिद्धांत आतंकवादी ठिकानों को नष्ट करने के अधिकार पर आधारित है, अगर पाकिस्तान में 'अस्वीकार्य' आतंकवादी हमला करने की तैयारी की जा रही है।।
यह भी ध्यान देने योग्य है कि भारत ने 1999 में कारगिल में पाकिस्तान की नियमित सैन्य घुसपैठ को विफल करने के लिए अपने रक्षा बलों की पूरी ताकत का इस्तेमाल किया था, लेकिन वह स्थिति स्पष्ट रूप से आतंकवाद के दायरे में नहीं आती थी। इसलिए, निरंतर गतिज कार्रवाई ने कोई दुविधा पैदा नहीं की।
पाकिस्तान द्वारा अपने पड़ोसियों के खिलाफ आतंकवाद का इस्तेमाल आम तौर पर प्रमुख शक्तियों द्वारा स्वीकार किया जाता है। वर्षों से इसके द्वारा विश्वसनीय इनकार पर भरोसा करना टिकाऊ नहीं रहा है। भारत ने भी पाकिस्तानी आतंकवादी समूहों को आतंकवादी घटनाओं से जोड़ने वाली सामग्री दी है, लेकिन पाकिस्तान ने उनके खिलाफ कोई कार्रवाई नहीं की है। मुंबई आतंकवादी हमले के बाद यह स्पष्ट हो गया था।
जनवरी 2016 में पठानकोट एयरबेस पर हुए हमले के बाद भारत ने एक पाकिस्तानी टीम को एयरबेस का दौरा करने की अनुमति दी थी, जिसमें एक इंटर-सर्विसेज इंटेलिजेंस अधिकारी भी शामिल था। हालांकि, पाकिस्तान ने फिर से जांच को आगे नहीं बढ़ाया। इन मामलों के बावजूद, अंतरराष्ट्रीय समुदाय के साथ भारतीय दावों की विश्वसनीयता सुनिश्चित करने के लिए आतंकवादी मामलों में सूचना और सबूत साझा करने की प्रथा को जारी रखना महत्वपूर्ण है।
रियासी हमले के बाद विदेश मंत्री एस जयशंकर ने "वर्षों पुराने सीमा पार आतंकवाद का समाधान" खोजने की महत्वाकांक्षी मंशा जाहिर की। वे अंतरराष्ट्रीय समुदाय को यह बताकर पाकिस्तानी आतंकवाद पर लगाम लगाने की प्रक्रिया शुरू कर सकते हैं कि परमाणु देशों के बीच बढ़ते तनाव की पहली सीढ़ी आतंक का इस्तेमाल है।
स्रोत: द हिन्दू.........................................
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