On balance, a long war between Hamas and Israel does not seem likely
There are uncanny अलौकिक similarities between the Hamas operation Toofan Al-Aqsa (Al-Aqsa Flood) and the launch of the 19-day Yom Kippur War 50 years ago.
Although the latter was inconclusive, it led to a regional tectonic shift with Israel accepting a ‘land for peace’ formula at the Camp David Accords six years later.
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Key takeaways
From a military perspective, despite the fighting on its territory, Israel is not under an existential अस्तित्व threat.
The outcome is also not in doubt:
1 Israel is expected to prevail / strong move , and push back Hamas, which lacks resources to sustain the campaign.
2 A massive ground incursion into Gaza
could follow to exact
🌺 vengeance प्रतिशोध,
🌺 restore morale,
🌺 re-impose the strategic asymmetry,
🌺and try to rescue captured soldiers and civilians.
3 intelligence failure
The unsavoury experiences from abject intelligence failure to the misplaced reliance on hi-tech missile defence and Artificial Intelligence would compel Israel to revise its strategic doctrines.
4 this conflict could potentially revive the ‘military option’ and further boost
the standing of non-state Arab militias, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, al-Houthis, Islamic State, various avatars of al-Qaeda, and Al-Shabaab.
5 conflict will remain geographically confined as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both Gaza-based Sunni outfits, have few all-weather friends.
In the domestic arena, the Palestinian Authority
1 is vertically split between the West Bank run by al-Fatah, in a modus vivendi with Israeli occupation authorities, and Gaza administered by Hamas, which refuses to recognise Israel.
2 As the Fatah has failed to stop Israeli land grabs in the West Bank, it is losing credibility with the masses, particularly young Palestinians.
3 Hamas and Islamic Jihad are taking advantage to establish their cells in the West Bank, leading to an iron-fisted Israeli response.
4 Thus, while the Palestinian Authority would praise “the resistance” and express indignation at the Israeli “war crimes”, it would privately wish something else for its two political rivals.
Regionally, too, the granular picture is largely non-supportive of Hamas
1 Egypt
The only Arab neighbour of Gaza is Egypt, whose pro-West military regime has little love lost for the Gazan rulers as they were allies of the Muslim Brotherhood that Egyptian generals end in 2013.
2 Cairo
nevertheless, is trying to de-escalate the current situation.
3 All the Gulf monarchies
except Qatar, strongly disapprove of Hamas, calling it a political Islamic outfit.
Although Qatar regularly provides generous dollops of humanitarian assistance to the Gazans, it does not wish to annoy Washington.
4 Turkey
a big regional Sunni power, traditionally supports Hamas, but Ankara’s badly bruised economy has limited its outreach. Moreover, it is trying to reconnect with Israel and the Gulf monarchies.
5 Damascus and Hamas
Hamas and Islamic Jihad burnt their bridges with Damascus a decade ago by supporting the anti-Assad Arab Spring intifada.
While Damascus and Hamas had a facile reconciliation last year, the latter’s karma still rankles.
6 Shia Iran
has long been a mentor of the two Sunni outfits, at one point creating a clandestine weapons and ammunition supply line through Sudan and Egypt to Gaza.
Iran has tried to replicate its success in creating a Hezbollah-type proto-state in Gaza to threaten Israel on two fronts. Other pro-Iranian regional outfits like al-Houthis could support the Gazans.
7 इस प्रकार, संतुलन पर, हमास और इज़राइल के बीच एक लंबे युद्ध की संभावना कम लगती है, जब तक कि हमास इजरायली बंधकों की रिहाई के लिए बातचीत करने में अपना हाथ आगे नहीं बढ़ाता है, जो कि इजरायल के लिए एक बड़ी उपलब्धि है, जिसने सभी दांव बंद कर दिए हैं।
A ‘double or quits’ option
This crisis effectively presents Israel’s current 10-month-old ultra-nationalist government with a ‘double or quits’ option.
Even before Toofan Al-Aqsa, Jerusalem’s hard-line has led to a surge in violence with over 200 Palestinians and 30 Israelis dead this year
The profound consequences for regional geopolitics could include a delay in the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel as Tel Aviv would be unwilling to grant the concessions to the Palestinians sought by Riyadh.
Other Abraham Accords signatories would hope that their wager on economic gains riding roughshod over the regional politics would stand. Iran could feel emboldened by the arch-enemy being in mortal combat.
While India is not directly affected by Toofan Al-Aqsa, it would, nevertheless feel some heat. Protracted regional turbulence could cause collateral damage through an oil price rise, impact our diaspora, and dim the prospects for India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and other I2U2 constructs. It can also highlight India as a safe, fast-growing economy for foreign investments, largely insulated from the turmoil.
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