SC’s EVM verdict

​SC’s EVM verdict

Software intended for public use in a democracy needs to be open source so it’s always reliable and doesn’t demand trust in a single vendor

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Some debate regarding EVM 

1 source code

In the first instance, advocate Santhosh Paul for the petitioners said EVMs have a “source code” that should be disclosed for independent verification,

 to which Justice Khanna replied, “The source code should never be disclosed. If it is disclosed, it will be misused.” 

2 whether the microcontrollers in the EVM’s three components could be reprogrammed

 an EC official said they couldn’t. Advocate Prashant Bhushan, for the petitioners, disputed this claim saying the 

microcontrollers’ manufacturer’s data suggested they could be. 

Justice Khanna then said, “He [the official] has clarified the doubt” and that “we have to rely on them [EC] on technical data”.

 In a final instance, the Bench passed the order on April 26, refusing to revert to paper ballots and said “blind distrust” of the system is bad for progress.

Across these instances, two impressions shine through

that the security of the EVMs depends on some unspecified “source code” 

and that knowing how something works could compromise its normal operation. Both these notions are inimical to democracy.

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Second, knowing how some software works doesn’t also compromise it. For example, by the sheer scale of its use on millions of websites, the WordPress content management system faces more (unethical) hacking attempts, yet it continues to remain popular and secure. This may be all the more surprising because WordPress is open source; its “source code” is freely available to download. There are several thousand people who know how WordPress works but that doesn’t mean they also know how to ‘hack’ WordPress websites.

It’s not unreasonable to expect the software operating inside EVMs to meet the same standard. If it did, it would be independently verifiable and be able to benefit from the expertise of ethical testers to become more fail-proof, rather than rely on a secret that’s privy to the EC and whose modes of failure may remain unknown. There are well-established cryptographic techniques to allow outside verification without increasing an EVM’s vulnerability, such as tests that challenge the system’s schematicswithout forcing them to be revealed — the way a website’s server can verify if your password is correct without knowing what it is. It’s not for nothing that the software underlying electronic voting systems in Germany, the U.S., and Venezuela, among other countries, is open source.

However, the EC hadn’t had the source code audited by a public authority as of 2023. The Technical Expert Committee had suggested in 1990 and 2006 that the EC reveal the source code. In 2013, it recommended a test of the software’s security without revealing its specifics. But the poll body has consistently refused to share the “source code” when members of civil society have approached courts asking for it. The trouble here is that courts have examined these claims from a constitutional perspective whereas the systems that execute the “code” are mathematical, and thus less protected by constitutional safeguards alone.

A software program being proprietary doesn’t make it more secure; in fact, it may be less so by virtue of fewer people being able to vet it. Fundamentally, software intended for public use in a democracy needs to be open source so it’s always reliable and doesn’t demand trust in a single vendor. It needs to be trustworthy — bearing a reputation that doesn’t constantly come under question — and trustless — not requiring someone to just take someone else’s word for it as to its integrity. Trustless software in particular eliminates the room not for trust but for distrust.

mukunth.v@thehindu.co.in

Source the hindu